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Abstract: The aim of the paper is to discuss the possible application of the theory of embodied cognition and the 
category of image schemata to the study of religious concepts within the Cognitive Science of Religion. Departing 
from the notion of counterintuitiveness and Boyer’s description of religious representations as minimally 
counterintuitive, the author briefly discusses the critique of this approach. Subsequently, different models of 
mind and cognition within the Cognitive Science are summarised, with special attention given to the enactive 
approach, as proposed by Varela, Thompson and Rosch. The notion of embodied meaning, situated within 
enactivism, is then discussed, together with Johnson’s concept of image schemata as basic semantic units. To 
discuss the applicability of image schemata in the study of religious concepts, the author summarises a case 
study, related to the interpretation of the categories of sāṃkhya-yoga darśana in Iyengar Yoga.  
Keywords: counterintuitiveness, ontological categories, enactivism, embodied cognition, enaction, image 
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Introduction
As the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) began to emerge, its appeal arose from the fact, that it opened 
the researcher’s eyes to the intricacies of human mind1 and the role it played in shaping, understanding 
and transmitting religious2 representations3. Despite its naturalistic approach, it did not bluntly dismiss 
religious beliefs as at odds with the findings of natural sciences. On the contrary, it strove to show, how a 
1 The mindblindness of earlier theories of religion was discussed extensively by Scott Atran. See Atran, “In Gods We Trust”, 
14-15, 199 ff. 
2 The terms religious and religion are used in the present paper as a “convenient, non-technical pointer” (Boyer, “Explaining 
Religious Concepts”, 171) to the vast field of interest of the study of religion. The author is sympathetic with the stance Boyer 
has been propagating most recently, which is that there is no single, universal and cross-cultural (or even culture-independent) 
phenomenon that may unambiguously be called religion (see also Boyer, “Why would (otherwise intelligent) scholars believe 
in ‘Religion’?” and the foregoing discussion). Even though in the following paragraphs a definition of religion is cited and a 
proposal is presented to approach religious phenomena from a particular angle, it is for the purpose of keeping the subject 
matter transparent, and not for the sake of arguing, what religion is or isn’t. The author does not claim that religion is a relation 
between ritually-grounded systems of image schemata and concepts coherent with them, rather than commitment to a world 
of counterintuitive agents. The much more modest claim is that looking at sets of concepts from the perspective of ritually-
grounded image schemata might be a fruitful approach in describing and comparing a variety of concepts studied by CSR.
3 The notion of representation poses important problems within CS, and the difference in its understanding constitutes the 
most important divide between cognitivism and enactivism, two of the approaches summarised in the present paper. On the 
following pages, the term representation denotes the general, weak and “relatively uncontroversial notion of… construal, [i.e.] 
construing or representing the world a certain way” (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, “The Embodied Mind”, 134). When talking 
of representation in a stronger sense, adhered to by cognitivism and meaning symbolic mental content undergoing computational 
processing, the author talks of propositional knowledge/information. The concept of cognition as manipulating propositional 
content (or representations in the strong sense) has been rejected in its entirety by the more radical branch of enactivism (see 
Hutto and Myin, “Radicalizing Enactivism”). For the discussion of the enactive vs. cognitivist paradigm, see below. 
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very natural phenomenon - namely evolved human cognitive processes - make the emergence of religious 
thinking inevitable. To account for the ubiquity of religious concepts and modes of behaviour, it attempted 
to create a “groundwork to investigate formally the relationship between ‘basic parts of human nature’ 
and how they interact with specific local contexts”4. The cornerstone of this groundwork became the 
concept of counterintuitiveness, developed by Pascal Boyer5, and subsequently discussed, elaborated and 
questioned in numerous publications6. Boyer’s proposal was that religious representations are minimally 
counterintuitive (MCI), which makes them particularly compatible with human minds, easy to memorise, 
and thus gives them transmission advantage over other representations. Ever since these claims, empirical 
studies have flourished, investigating the MCI nature of religious concepts and their alleged superior 
memorability. Justin Barrett7 proposed a method of quantifying and coding counterintuitiveness, providing 
what was meant to be a universal system of breaking down religious beliefs into transparent, clear-cut units 
readily available for comparative analysis.
The notion of moderate counterintuitiveness, by virtue of its simplicity, seeming transparency and 
compatibility with a particular model of the mind, presents itself as an attractive and effective tool for the 
analysis of religious thought. However, its weaknesses, and the weaknesses of the studies, which put it to 
use, could not escape critique8. Breaking religion down into MCI concepts made it appealingly analysable, 
but, among its other flaws, it took the researchers’ minds off the complexities of religious contexts, and 
such fundamental elements of religion as ritual activity.
As language and action are the only means to transmit concepts, religious concepts cannot - or at least 
should not - be isolated from their linguistic and performative context. As, within the cognitive paradigm, 
Cognitive Linguistics (CL) provides valuable insights into the relation between representations, action 
patterns and grammatico-lexical systems, it is tempting to incorporate these insights into the study of how 
religious representations are assembled, comprehended and transmitted within larger narratives and ritual 
activities. It is the aim of the present paper to propose a way of applying the categories of CL in the study 
of religious representations. It is not the author’s goal to dismiss the notion of counterintuitiveness in its 
entirety, nor to propose a completely alternative mode of describing religious concepts. The paper attempts 
to provide a complementary look at the emergence of religious ideas, still situated within the cognitive 
paradigm, but taking into consideration a different model of cognition and applying different interpretative 
tools.
What We Talk About When We Talk About The Counterintuitive
Let the departure point for the present discussion be Scott Atran’s definition of religion as “a community’s 
costly and hard-to-fake commitment… to a counterfactual and counterintuitive world of supernatural 
agents… who master people’s existential anxieties, such as death and deception”9. This definition is 
comprehensive and applicable to a broad scope of phenomena, especially as it takes into account the social 
dimension of religious attitudes and as, through the use of the term commitment, it avoids equating religion 
with belief only. However, the notions of costliness, counterfactuality and counterintuiveness may raise 
certain doubts. Presently, only the latter of the terms will be taken into consideration.
The term counterintuitive was proposed by Pascal Boyer to denote concepts “including information 
contradicting some information provided by ontological categories”10. Ontological categories, on the 
other hand, are abstract and highly general concepts - such as ANIMAL, PERSON, PLANT or TOOL - which 
4 Purzycki and Willard, “MCI theory: a critical discussion”, 6.
5 See e.g. Boyer, “The Naturalness of Religious Ideas”, “Religion Explained”.
6 A few of these publications will be referred to on the following pages.
7 Barrett, “Coding and Quantifying Counterintuitiveness in Religious Concepts”.
8 In this regard, see e.g. Purzycki and Willard, “MCI theory: a critical discussion”.
9 Atran, “In Gods We Trust”, 4.
10 Boyer, “Religion Explained”, 65.
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provide basic templates for recognition and classification of perceived phenomena11. They include certain 
default inferences, in forms of “mini-theories” (e.g. “ANIMALS have to eat to survive” or “PERSONS can 
talk”), which make it possible to acquire new concepts promptly, based on only partial perceptual data12. 
Thus, counterintuitive concepts are those, which in some respects violate the “mini-theories” about given 
ontological categories, while remaining faithful to them in other aspects. They may do so by lacking certain 
inferences typical of a category (so called breaches - e.g. an ANIMAL that does not die) or by including 
inferences borrowed from another category (transfers - e.g. a PLANT that can talk). According to Boyer 
and his fellow scholars, such minimal counterintuitiveness (MCI) is one of the key features of all religious 
concepts, contributing greatly to their attractiveness and prevalence.
Boyer himself is cautious when using the term counterintuitive. He stresses that “[i]t does not mean 
strange, inexplicable, funny, exceptional or extraordinary. What is counterintuitive... is not even necessarily 
surprising”13. He is wary, that “the ordinary sense of the term… may be misleading” and suggests that the 
expression counterlogical might be a safer choice. Though a slightly repulsive neologism, this expression 
does have the virtue of not bringing about a variety of connotations that the notion of intuition awakens. Still, 
the positioning of the term intuitive after the counter is quite well justified. It communicates the message, 
that the counterintuitive beings somehow oppose the rules of so-called intuitive biology, intuitive psychology 
or intuitive physics - sets of theories, possibly innate and processed in propositional form, pertaining to the 
phenomena cognised by humans. These theories are deemed intuitive by virtue of being universal and 
concordant with the everyday experience of the world. Still, they may not be the preferred tools for ordering 
and interpreting this experience. In other words, what is intuitive might go beyond understanding, that 
animals breed, people do not know what they haven’t seen or haven’t been told and rocks fall when thrown 
in the air.
There is an important assumption underlying such understanding of counterintuitive concepts. It is 
that the default mode of human cognition is based on universal logic and has propositional14 character. 
However, numerous anthropologists, with Lévy-Bruhl15 and Lévi-Strauss16 in their avant-garde, have 
been pointing out for decades that there is more to human “logic” than formulating syllogisms such 
as: Persons are born and die and God is a person, ergo God should be born and die (and it goes against 
intuition to believe that he is not and does not). Besides, the argument of opposing (onto)logical 
categories can only go that far in explaining the large variety of religious phenomena. To apply one of 
the most famous ethnological examples, the famed (and almost fabled) puzzle of the Bororo locution 
(pa e-do nabure - “we become macaws”) can hardly be solved by claiming that the Bororo men believe in 
illogical statements or that they consider themselves shape-shifting, and thus counterintuitive, persons. 
What needs to be taken into account is the specific experience of the Bororo related to their interaction 
with the natural and social environment, and the specific context of the quoted locution - namely ritual 
activity17. This experience and this context go beyond both the stating and application of propositional 
11 The findings of cognitive psychology do not support the view that ontological categories are the most rudimentary tools for 
classifying. As Eleanor Rosch points out, categories as general and abstract as ANIMAL or PLANT are not the most basic ones, 
as they allow few inferences and may not be represented through imagery. The most inclusive categories, allowing for rich 
inferences about their members and thus for the most effective classification, are what Rosch calls basic-level objects, such as 
CAT, TREE or CHAIR (rather than ANIMAL, PLANT or TOOL). Studies show that during perception objects are first recognised 
as members of a basic category, and not a superordinate one. Basic objects also likely constitute the first categorisations of 
perceived objects during child development. See Rosch, “Principles of Categorization”, 189-206.
12 Boyer, “Religion Explained”, 60-63.
13 Ibid., 65.
14 The propositional character of cognition in this model can be summarised as passive reception of objective information 
from the external environment, coding it into abstract propositions representing this information symbolically, and then 
manipulating these propositions in the isolated, internal environment of the mind. 
15 Lévy-Bruhl, “Primitive Mentality”.
16 Lévi-Strauss, “The Savage Mind”.
17 See e.g. Turner, “‘We are Parrots’, ‘Twins are Birds’”, 121-189.
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“mini-theories” and they provide a range of schemata18 which may render the men “becoming macaws” 
quite logical and intuitive.
The foregoing reservation, expressed in a general way and meant merely as an introduction to the 
forthcoming discussion, is one of many complaints about the notion of counterintuitiveness that have been 
raised over the past years. What follows is but a short summary of a few of them.
Justin Barrett19 undermines the universality of the counterintuitive character of religious representations 
by distinguishing between two levels of concept-understanding applied in different contexts. Though on a 
theoretical level, applied in formal discourse and allowing for longer processing time, concepts (including 
religious concepts) may be complex and have a high degree of counterintuitiveness, on a basic level, 
effective when quick inferences need to be made, “naïve intuitive knowledge”20 is applied. This argument is 
aligned with the dual processing model21, distinguishing between cognition as an immediate response to the 
environment and as a reflective process aimed at updating our understanding of that environment. It does 
not, however, render Boyer’s theory invalid. According to the latter, successful religious representations 
are MCI, only minimally counterintuitive, so that most of the features of an ontological category they are 
grounded in are retained, allowing for swift on-line inferences. It is maximum counterintuitiveness (MAX) 
that shifts a concept towards the theoretical pole of the cognitive demands axis22. Such counterintuitiveness 
does not, according to Boyer, characterise the most widespread religious concepts. Moreover, in the cited 
work, the notion of intuitiveness still remains somewhat  vague. In his later work23, Barrett proposes a 
system for grading the degree of counterintuitiveness, and even allows that apparently MAX concepts may 
be entirely intuitive sensu Boyer. This issue will be discussed further on.
Maurice Bloch24 raises different doubts pertaining to the subject, related to the social context of the 
emergence of religious ideas. Referring to his own ethnographic example - the Malagasy - he points out that 
religious agents, such as the ancestors, are treated not as an exclusive category (in this case of dead people 
who can still communicate), but just as regular persons (i.e. living ascendants). Though communication 
with them may be slightly more difficult, it is perceived as utterly ordinary, and so are the attitudes and 
emotions directed towards them. This fact may be at least partially explained by Barrett’s postulate that the 
category of PERSON does not need to assume cognitive expectation of Physicality and Biology25. It might 
not matter to the Malagasy - or to any other people, for that matter - whether their ascendants have bodies 
prone to death or not, as long as they have minds. Still, this is a departure from Boyer’s classical view, 
according to which having a mind that goes on after the body’s decay is an ontological breach.
Another of Bloch’s points is that religious notions, when expressed explicitly, are so well-known, that 
they become intuitive merely by the virtue of their ubiquity. Hearing a given narrative often enough renders 
18 Here the term schema is used in a fairly general sense, and may perhaps be best defined as “the organization of cognitive 
elements into an abstract mental object capable of being held in working memory with default values or open slots which can be 
variously filled in with appropriate specifics” (D’Andrade, “The development of cognitive anthropology”, 179). Such definition 
does not specify the nature of the “mental object”, and it does not distinguish between propositional vs. embodied knowledge. 
It may encompass schemata sensu Barrett (“Coding and Quantifying Counterintuitiveness in Religious Concepts”, 312), 
understood as patterns derived from practiced natural knowledge only (for definition of practiced vs. maturational naturalness, 
see McCauley, “Why Religion in Natural and Science is Not”, 26 ff.), or, in a broader sense, “strictly learned” rather than innate 
(Purzycki, “Cognitive Architecture, Humor and Counterintuitiveness”, 191). It may also refer to image schemata sensu Johnson, 
i.e. “embodied patterns of meaningfully organized experience” (Johnson, “The Body in the Mind”, 19) or “recurrent pattern[s], 
shape[s], and regularit[ies]” applied to order “actions, perceptions and conceptions” (Johnson, “The Body in the Mind”, 29). 
Johnson’s understanding of image schemata in terms of embodied experience presents them as experientially acquired rather 
than innate, but does not distinguish between their practiced vs. maturational origin. This understanding, grounded in the 
concept of embodied cognition, will be discussed in more detail on the forthcoming pages.
19 Barrett, “Theological Correctness”, 325-339.
20 Ibid., 326.
21 Purzycki and Willard, “MCI theory: a critical discussion”, 3.
22 See Barrett, “Theological Correctness”, 327.
23 Barrett, “Coding and Quantifying Counterintuitiveness in Religious Concepts”. 
24 Bloch, “Are Religious Beliefs Counterintuitive?”, 129-146.
25 Barrett, “Coding and Quantifying Counterintuitiveness in Religious Concepts”, 321. This issue will be elaborated on in more 
detail further on.
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it self-evident and completely usual. The notion of ancestors, entrenched in the minds of generations of 
the Malagasy, is accepted as uncritically as the notion of counterintuitiveness entrenched in the minds of 
the cognitive scholars of religion. Understanding this notion becomes a habit, which requires no special 
cognitive operations of jumping between ontological categories. Of course a careful reader might point out, 
that Bloch’s argument is based on an understanding of the intuitive much different from Boyer’s. While for 
the latter scholar what is intuitive is in accord with the rules of folk physics, folk biology and folk psychology, 
for the former it is all that is commonly accepted. Boyer argues, that certain notions are commonplace 
because they are minimally counterintuitive (and as such may be easily remembered and transmitted). 
Bloch responds, that on the contrary, these notions are intuitive, because they are commonplace. These 
are not opposing views and it is possible to reconcile them by concluding, that religious concepts become 
intuitive (sensu Bloch) by virtue of being minimally counterintuitive (sensu Boyer). This clash of definitions 
is partially related to the counterintuitive vs. counterschematic dilemma, stemming from the difficulty in 
establishing, where the universal, innate knowledge ends and where context-specific, acquired knowledge 
begins.
The question of the interaction between cognitive modules (innate, domain-specific and responsible for 
the identification of particular ontological categories) and cognitive schemata (domain-general and acquired 
through learning) is one of the issues raised most recently in Benjamin Purzycki and Aiyana Willard’s 
discussion of the MCI theory26. To provide an alternative distinction (not necessarily overlapping precisely 
with the module-schema dualism), the authors talk about deep inferences (found already in young children 
and based on knowledge provided directly by cognitive faculties) versus shallow inferences (based on more 
specific relationships between concepts and reflective information)27. With increasing experience, shallow 
inferences are updated, allowing for the attribution of different qualities to different objects depending 
on the context. The difficulty in establishing whether or not a representation is a counterintuitive one lies 
in assessing its interpretation in terms of deep inferences related to it (e.g. an INANIMATE LIVING THING 
moves on its own, therefore a counterintuitive transfer occurs), or in terms of shallow ones (a flower is 
bobbing in the wind, like flowers do)28. Unless a way is established to indicate, which mode of drawing 
inferences is activated in a given context, it is impossible to conclude, whether a concept is represented as 
a counterintuitive one, or not.
Another matter is that of transmission of concepts. Even if initially a concept violates deep inferences, 
once it is remembered, it acquires a schematic representation relative to other available schemata. Once 
recalled and described to a second party, it activates the newly acquired schema that is intuitive by virtue 
of its incorporation into the broader scope of schemata, counterschematic by virtue of its incompatibility 
with its schematic prototype, and possibly counterintuitive in relation to the deep inferences it is supposed 
to undermine29. If the author of the present paper understands this line of argument correctly, unless a 
method is proposed to establish clearly, whether a particular inference is made based on the fixed, module-
specific information or on the flexible and cross-modular system of schemata, there is no clear way to 
establish whether a given concept is represented as counterintuitive or not. In other words, the distinction 
between the counterintuitive and the counterschematic remains blurry and there is no telling which of 
these two categories provide for more successful transmission and retention30. If there is no telling whether 
a concept is mentally processed as MCI or not, the argument that MCI concepts are remembered better, and 
thus provide a good foundation for religious thought, remains suspended in thin air.
26 Purzycki and Willard, “MCI theory: a critical discussion”.
27 Ibid., 6.
28 Ibid., 18-19.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 21.
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From Computation to Enaction. Models of the Mind and Concept 
Acquisition
Much of the confusion related to the notion of counterintuitiveness is related to the fact that it draws on 
a very particular model of the mind and cognition. Boyer’s concept assumes that the mind is a system of 
computational modules, each designed by evolution to solve specific problems related to the interaction 
with the environment31.  These modules are innate, encapsulated (i.e. percepts processed by one module 
which do not affect other modules), inaccessible (i.e. the flow of information between them is constrained) 
and domain-specific (specialised to process differently structured kinds of information)32. This model 
represents cognitive systems as rigid, designed to process precisely delimited sets of information, whereas 
experiential, context-based knowledge demands for flexibility, malleability and interconnectedness of the 
structures involved in its manipulation.
An alternative model of the mind, labelled connectionism, allows for a greater plasticity of cognitive 
structures. According to its proponents cognitive operations are a result of the functioning not of singular 
mental modules, but rather of groups of simple components, across which many operations are distributed. 
These components are connected into networks, whose cooperation results in the emergence of  global 
activity aimed at processing specific tasks33. By assuming the interconnectedness of processing units 
and the plasticity of links between them, connectionism provides a different view on learning processes, 
diminishing the significance of innate, implicit knowledge. Acquiring new information is not viewed as 
inserting new propositional information into the slots of prefabricated modules, but rather creating new 
connections between different units or changing the weight of connections already developed34. Among the 
approaches to counterintuitiveness, M. Afzal Upal’s critique assumes the connectionist view35. In his context-
based approach (as opposed to Boyer’s concept-based approach), Upal lays emphasis on the significance 
of the co-occurrence of concepts in larger conceptual systems to explain their salience and memorability, 
rather than on their alleged inherent structure. In his spreading activation model36, different concepts are 
represented in connection to other concepts, and the strength of these connections depends on the expected 
likelihood of those concepts’ co-occurrence37. When a single concept is activated, the stimulus spreads 
onto neighbouring concepts. If a following concept is an expected one and has an established position 
in the net of connections, the connection between it and the first concept is strengthened. If expectation 
violation occurs, i.e. a concept with no established connection follows, a learning opportunity emerges 
and the existing model is updated. Because memorising concepts that promise the most information 
gain may be adaptively advantageous, such concepts, which violate co-occurrence expectations and 
thus result in the rewiring of existing net of connections, may be more memorable. However, as the new 
configuration becomes established, its salience diminishes. So even if unexpectedness is interpreted as a 
case of counterintuitiveness, it is only a temporary phenomenon, which fades as the new context becomes 
entrenched. It is for that reason that over time the counterintuitiveness of religious concepts must actually 
increase - it is the only way they may keep up with the ever adaptive and innovative human cognitive 
structures38. 
31 See Pinker, “How the Mind Works”, 21.
32 Fodor, “The Modularity of Mind”. The model applied within CSR is a variation on Fodor’s model, proposed by Dan Sperber. 
According to Fodor, only the sensory inputs of the cognitive systems are modular.  Sperber argues, on the other hand, that to 
account for cultural diversity and the plasticity of the human mind, one needs to assume that also conceptual processing occurs 
in a modular manner. Sperber, “Explaining Culture”, 119-150.
33 Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, “The Embodied Mind”, 8.
34 Cf. Purzycki and Willard, “MCI theory: a critical discussion”, 11.
35 Upal, “An alternative account of the minimal counterintuitiveness effect”, 194-203.
36 Ibid., 197.
37 This is a metaphorical application of the so-called Hebbian rule related to the creation of neuronal interconnections, which 
can be summarised as “neurons that fire together, wire together”. Hebb, “The Organization of Behavior”. See also e.g. Varela, 
Thompson, and Rosch, “The Embodied Mind”, 87 ff. or Goldman, “Simulating Minds”, 142 ff.
38 Upal, “An alternative account of the minimal counterintuitiveness effect”, 201.
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The third model of cognition, namely enactivism39, also takes account of the malleability of cognitive 
structures and the significance of context for the acquisition and ordering of knowledge. However, it breaks 
the divide between the information-filled environment and the isolated mental conceptual structures, 
by treating the body, connected dynamically to its surroundings through its sensorimotor system, as an 
autonomous, cognising agent and the “ultimate source of significance”40. According to Francisco Varela, 
Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch, cognition involves continuous enactment of the experienced world 
through the execution of recurrent sensorimotor patterns41. It is neither passive apprehension of data and 
sliding them into appropriate slots, nor gradual rewiring of conceptual networks, but interacting with 
the surroundings through sensory and motor activity while assembling - and reassembling - dynamic 
representations of this interaction42. These representations are not propositional, but embodied - they retain 
their blueprint in form of the feeling of the body, its spatial orientation, motor abilities and limitations, as 
well as modes of interaction with the physical and social environment. 
Mark Johnson43 provided the description of concept formation compatible with the notion of embodied 
cognition. He proposed that rather than being represented propositionally, concepts are assembled of image 
schemata (IS)44 - non-propositional structures of meaning45 in the form of most basic diagrams abstracted 
from everyday sensorimotor experience46. IS, being patterns of human interaction with the environment, 
are dynamic structures. They can be derived from the information belonging to a particular sensory 
modality (visual, auditory, tactile etc.), but can also be cross-modal. They can also stem from such domains 
as social interaction or proprioception (with its experience of pain, weariness, exerting muscular force and 
the like)47. IS are complex (they may be built of smaller parts and relations between them) and malleable 
(they may be reshaped to fit any given rich - i.e. non-schematic - representation). Thus, the IS of an OBJECT 
MOVING OUT OF A CONTAINER may be applied to understand (or enact) the notion of an egg falling out 
of a basket, an internal organ sneaking out of one’s body to cause havoc (Boyer’s ethnographic example 
acquired among the Fang people)48 or a goddess jumping out of her father’s head. In this way notions which 
may be viewed as a transfer or a breach of an ontological category (according to folk biology internal organs 
are not animate and intentional, and men do not gestate offspring is their heads), or a violation of learned 
schemata, may be experienced through the application of a very familiar, embodied IS. In fact, the IS of 
a CONTAINER is most likely grounded in a very basic experience - namely of one’s own body, into which 
various objects (e.g. food items) may be put and out of which other objects and substances (e.g. feces, blood 
39 Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, “The Embodied Mind”, 147 ff.
40 Di Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher, “Horizons for the Enactive Mind”, 42.
41 Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, “The Embodied Mind”, 9, 173.
42 As mentioned before, not all strands within enactivism endorse the idea, that cognition involves representation, even in a 
weak, non-propositionalist sense. See Hutto and Myin, “Radicalizing Enactivism”.
43 Johnson, “The Body in the Mind”.
44 To avoid confusion with the previously applied denotation of the term schema, the acronym IS is applied in the forthcoming 
part of the paper.
45 The notion of meaning is quite blurry and not at all as self-explanatory as one might hope. In Johnson’s sense, this term 
refers not only to linguistic meaning (understood as a relation between a signifiant and its corresponding signifié) but also to 
the significance of the objects of cognition in relation to the totality of experience. Thus, attributing meaning to the elements of 
the perceived world would be equal to ordering the experience of this world. Such understanding of meaningfulness is negated 
by Sperber, who proposes to distinguish between semiological systems and cognitive systems, attributing the latter with the 
function of organising experience. Sperber dismisses the semiotic character of symbolic structures as described by Lévi-Strauss, 
claiming that rather than providing meaning, they merely provide order (Sperber, “Rethinking Symbolism”, 51-84).
46 Johnson, “The Body in the Mind”, 19-40.
47 Johnson’s broad definition of image schemata may seem not precise enough. Ronald Langacker proposes a more clear-
cut classification of embodied conceptual units. He distinguishes between minimal concepts, related to particular sensory 
modalities and domains of experience (line or angle in space, brightness or colours in vision, precedence or simultaneity 
in the temporal domain), configurational concepts, which are cross-modal and represent relations abstracted from different 
experiential domains (e.g. boundary, contrast, change, continuity, etc.), and conceptual archetypes - composite, cross-modal 
structures derived from the most salient forms of experience (e.g. object in a location, a whole and its parts, effectuating change 
through exerting force, the human body, a face-to-face social interaction). Langacker, “Cognitive Grammar”, 33-34.
48 Boyer, “Religion Explained”, 270.
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or various excretions) come out49. Another valid example may be the IS of a GAS SUBSTANCE dissipating 
in the air. It may be evoked when one’s own exhalation forms a vanishing cloud on a frosty day, when one 
observes the steam over a boiling pot or when one construes an omnipresent deity50. What follows is that 
every religious concept, to be rendered meaningful and then memorised, must be represented (or enacted) 
through the application of the available IS. From this perspective, understanding the structure of religious 
concepts means establishing which configurations of IS are most prevalent in their representations, what 
domains of experience they draw upon and how they are related to larger contexts (religious narratives, 
ritual activity). The following part of the present paper will be an attempt to provide such understanding in 
regard to a single example.
Religious Concepts as Sets of Image Schemata. A Case Study
The author’s own study focuses on the formation of religio-philosophical concepts in the strands of Modern 
Postural Yoga (MPY)51. MPY is a term denoting systems of yoga practice that started to develop in South-
West India the first half of the 20th century, under the influence of European physical culture, indigenous 
athletic practices and the haṭha yoga tradition52. Nowadays, MPY strands are global movements, using 
English as their primary language. Their focus is on the practice of sequences of āsana (yogic postures) 
and prāṇāyāma (breath retention techniques). Even though their development was strongly influenced 
by colonial India’s interest in athletic practices, their founders and proponents have striven to legitimise 
their teachings, claiming direct correspondence to traditional religio-philosophical systems (darśana), 
namely sāṃkhya-yoga (mainly as expounded in the Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali) and vedānta. So far the main 
focus of the discussed study has been Iyengar Yoga, a style of practice developed by B.K.S. Iyengar (1918-
2014).
For the purpose of the present discussion, Iyengar’s interpretation of the concept of puruṣa will be 
presented. Puruṣa (sanskr. “man”, “person”) is a concept found already in the Ṛgveda. In Puruṣasūkta (ṚV 
10.90) it is a being sacrificed during the cosmogonic act, whose body parts are described as homologous to 
the phenomena of the natural and social world. The Vedic puruṣa shares certain qualities with some of the 
deities, namely Agni, Sūrya and Viṣṇu53. The concept also likely bears the characteristics of a vital element 
and a conscious principle of the human being54.
The latter part of the concept is developed in the upanishadic literature55. Here puruṣa is represented 
as a principle of subjectivity, related to the manifest (as opposed to the absolute or transcendent) aspect of 
reality. It is also a small entity, which resides in all “two- and four-legged cities”56, and occupies the area of 
the heart57. It is an animating principle, making the body conscious58.
The notion of puruṣa plays a central role in the dualistic ontology of sāṃkhya-yoga, where it is one of the 
two cosmological principles59. It is a conscious, yet passive and indifferent observer, substantially different 
from the manifest and unmanifest reality, but tied to it. It is transcendent (by virtue of its substantial 
otherness) and immanent at the same time (a multitude of puruṣāḥ are associated with particular psychico-
physical entities). It inspires the process of creation (realised by the active yet unconscious principle of 
prakṛti), which results in its liberation (i.e. the breaking of its bond with the manifest world).
49 Though indeed a basic mode of the construal of one’s own body, it seems that the IS of a CONTAINER is not the first one to 
be applied during early development. See Sheets-Johnstone, “Thinking in Movement”, 170 ff.
50 The possible relation between God concepts and the IS of a FLUID will be discussed further on.
51 De Michelis, “Modern Yoga and the Western Esoteric Tradition”, 187 ff. 
52 Singleton, “Yoga Body”, 95 ff.
53 Brown, “The Sources and Nature of Puruṣa in the Puruṣasūkta”.
54 Falk, “Mit psychologiczny w starożytnych Indiach”, 13-56.
55 Kudelska, “Purusza jako zasada podmiotowości w myśli Upaniszad”.
56 Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad II.5.18.
57 Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad IV.2.2-3; Kaṭhopaniṣad II.1.12-13, II.3.17.
58 Maitriyopaniṣad II.5.
59 Larson, “Classical Sāṃkhya”, 154 ff.
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The interpretation of puruṣa presented by Iyengar is largely informed by the concepts described 
above, but it has its unique characteristics, too. Iyengar’s puruṣa is a distinct OBJECT located within the 
CONTAINER of the body. As “an absolute knower, awareness personified”60, and “a Seer, not a player”61, it 
is passive, but conscious. It is often equated with the concept of soul, Universal Self or inner divinity (often 
associated with Viṣṇu). Interestingly, being construed as a PERSON, puruṣa is equipped with a conscious 
principle of its own (“[t]he self exists in the self”)62. Its mental structure reflects the mental structure of the 
human it inhabits - a notion of self-similarity is evident here, applying a synecdochico-metaphorical model, 
in which a part of a whole is similar to the whole. Additionally, Iyengar’s puruṣa is construed as an OBJECT 
IMMERSED IN FLUID, hidden at a bottom of a lake and brought to float on the surface as a result of yoga 
practice63. In can move in the fluid breath, to touch ”the inner layer of the skin”64.
To summarise, in the studied example one deals with a concept of deity construed as a minuscule 
PERSON, equipped with a MIND typical of persons and seated within a CONTAINER of the human body. It 
is attributed the quality of omniscience (as an absolute knower), acquired through the modality of SIGHT. 
At the same time, it has the quality of a small physical OBJECT, which can float and sink in the FLUID 
filling the body (such as breath). This representation may be interpreted in terms of its counterintuitive 
(i.e. counterontological) and counterschematic qualities. Puruṣa is a PERSON, with the expectation sets 
of Spatiality, Physicality, Biology, Animacy and Mentality attributed to it by default65. The expectation of 
Spatiality is breached (as puruṣa is abnormally small), while the expectation of Physicality might be retained 
(it is subject to physical forces - it can sink and float), but possibly also breached (it can pass through all 
the tissues of the body, reaching the frontier of the skin). The expectation of Biology is not elaborated in 
detail, but supposedly its fulfilment may be assumed. The expectation of Animacy is breached, as puruṣa 
is entirely passive. There is also a breach of Mentality, as it is omniscient. Thus, one ends up with a concept 
with at least four ontological breaches, which qualify it as a MAX concept, rather not suitable for effective 
memorisation and transmission66. 
Of course, it might be argued, that some of the features of puruṣa are (counter)schematic rather than 
counterontological. Its infinitesimal size might be a violation of the learned knowledge, that persons are 
large enough to be seen. However, the knowledge of the existence of microorganisms (obviously available to 
Iyengar) renders this quality coherent with a familiar schema. In the same way, the breach of Physicality may 
be coherent with a learned schema, representing microscopic organisms as small enough to pass through 
tissues, which are not entirely solid when seen in great magnification. Thus, the model may be rendered 
much more intuitive by the application of schematic knowledge, available to all IY practitioners, who are 
usually old enough to posses the most general ideas related to microbiology. Still, this correction does not 
qualify Iyengar’s concept of puruṣa unambiguously as a MCI concept, and does not say much about its 
momorability or similarity to other religious concepts (with the exception for the traditional representation 
of puruṣa summarised above).
Now a short detour is in place, explaining the method applied to the study of the discussed concept. 
Because the notion of IS (or of the basic conceptual units sensu Langacker67) provides the groundwork for 
the concept of linguistic meaning within Cognitive Linguistics (CL), IS analysis constitutes a basic tool for 
the study of linguistic expressions (beginning with single words and ending with complex narratives). It 
is the chief claim of CL that the semantic pole of linguistic constructions comprises of conceptualisation 
(i.e. dynamic mental construal) of the IS underlying them68. Thus the meaning of composite narratives 
60 Iyengar, “Light on the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali”, 129.
61 Iyengar, “Light of Life”, 137.
62 Iyengar, “Yoga Vṛkṣa”, 74.
63 Iyengar, “Light on the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali”, 178.
64 Iyengar, “Light of Life”, 60.
65 Cf. Barrett, “Coding and Quantifying Counterintuitiveness in Religious Concepts”, 317.
66 Cf. e.g. Norenzayan, Atran, Faulkner, and Schaller. “Memory and Mystery”, and Barrett, Burdett, and Porter, 
“Counterintuitiveness in Folktales”.
67 See footnote 47, p. 98 of the present paper.
68 Langacker, “Cognitive Grammar”, 15, 30 ff.
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may be brought down to the assemblies of IS they are made of. This is precisely what has been done in the 
discussed study so far, as the author has been studying Iyengar’s writings, sentence by sentence, to bring to 
the surface the most salient conceptualisations underlying certain concepts. The advantage of such method 
is, that it allows for the study of concepts in larger contexts, with other concepts they co-occur with. Thus, 
the notion of puruṣa may be positioned in relation to a vast set of other notions, which render it more 
comprehensible.
To give an example of such contextual relation, the concept of puruṣa may be juxtaposed to the concept 
of buddhi, one of the mental faculties of sāṃkhya-yoga. Buddhi is a component of citta, the tripartite 
conscious principle evolved from prakṛti during the cosmogonic process of sāṃkhya. It is the empirical 
consciousness69, responsible for higher-order cognitive functions, associated with reflection. It is equipped 
with a disposition to acquire salvific knowledge, pertaining to its own substantial difference from puruṣa. 
The chief ignorance (āvidya) in sāṃkhya-yoga, resulting in suffering and the unbroken cycle of rebirths, 
is related to the inability to distinguish between puruṣa (the absolute consciousness) and buddhi (the 
empirical consciousness). It is, however, buddhi itself which can recognise this confusion and once and for 
all terminate the interdependence of puruṣa and prakṛti.
In Iyengar’s writings, buddhi, like puruṣa, is represented as a minuscule PERSON residing INSIDE 
the human body. In fact, each part of the body or tissue has a buddhi of its own (expressions such as 
“intelligence of the knee” or “intelligence of the skin” are not uncommon)70. At the same time, however, 
it is represented as a FLUID, which may be distributed evenly inside the body71. The latter fact explains 
the notion of it being present in each body part - being fluid, it can be distributed into the knees, and it 
can also soak into the skin. To sum of, what one deals with is the construal of consciousness as FLUID 
FILLING THE BODY from within. This schematic representation is coherent with Iyengar’s representation of 
samādhi, the final stage of aṣṭāṅga yoga of Patañjali, as “the tracing of the source of consciousness — the 
seer [puruṣa] — and then diffusing its essence, impartially and evenly, throughout every particle of the… 
body”72. This construal may be explained by assuming, that the fluid buddhi, upon reaching the centre of 
the body (i.e. the heart) where puruṣa is seated, recognises it (thus dispelling the āvidya) and carries it to the 
more peripheral areas of the body. The notion of “diffusing the essence” suggests, that puruṣa is dissolved 
in buddhi, and the homogenous SOLUTION is then evenly spread.
There is no room here to ponder the possibly counterintuitive status of buddhi in Iyengar’s interpretation. 
However, it cannot be denied that the notion of a FLUID filling and flowing through the body is a very 
basic experience available to human organisms at a fairly young age. Needless to say, external contact with 
fluid substances is not uncommon, either. Thus, the IS of FLUIDITY is a very basic and familiar embodied 
schema, which renders the construal described above fairly comprehensible. The conceptualisation of 
consciousness and divinity in terms of FLUIDITY in various religious traditions (especially mystical ones) 
is surely a worthwhile pursuit, which might expose some interesting regularities visible at cross-cultural 
level.
An interesting matter, possibly partially explainable in terms of the aforementioned IS, is the suggestion 
concerning the cognitive expectation of Mentality presented by Barrett73. Reflections on the development 
of cognitive faculties in pre-school children (who acquire the ability to reason with disembodied imaginary 
friends at a fairly young age), lead him to believe that the conceptual activation of the expectation of 
Mentality does not require underlying assumptions of Biology and Physicality. The notion of Mind may be 
very well represented without a body accompanying it. This fact may be well explained in terms of embodied 
cognition - the experience of the reflective observation of one’s own thoughts may render the thinker of 
those thoughts independent of a bodily form74. This leads to Barrett’s discussion of the representation of 
69 Chapple, “Living Liberation in Sāṃkhya and Yoga”, 119.
70 Iyengar, “Yoga Vṛkṣa”, 31; “Light of the Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali”, 47. “Intelligence” is the term Iyengar applies to translate 
buddhi. 
71 See e.g. Iyengar, “Light on Life”, 28; “Light of the Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali”, 65. 
72 Iyengar, “Light of the Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali”, 4. 
73 Barrett, “Coding and Quantifying Counterintuitiveness in Religious Concepts”, 319-321.
74 Cf. Ciołkosz, “Ahankara, buddhi, manas, purusza”.
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the Judaeo-Christian God as Mind (disembodied by virtue of the intuitive feature of minds’ bodilessness, yet 
still located in space)75. The counterintuitiveness of the God concept lies in the fact that He is omnipresent. 
But, argues Barrett, if this omnipresence may be explained in terms of being evenly distributed across a very 
vast area, it becomes aligned with the intuitions regarding Spatiality. And where does the notion of even 
distribution come from, if not from the observation of fluids filling containers in a homogenous manner? 
Investigating the significance of the IS of FLUIDITY for the formation of notions regarding mentality and 
divinity seems like a worthwhile pursuit that may lead to fruitful conclusions.
Religious Concepts And the Ritual Embodied Experience. Forming 
New Intuitions
A cognitive approach to ritual was proposed in the seminal works of Robert McCauley and E. Thomas 
Lawson76, as well as of Harvey Whitehouse77. The role of ritual in the memorisation of religious notions was 
discussed fairly extensively in Atran’s equally seminal work78. However, it is still the complaint of scholars 
these days that not enough attention is given within CSR to the importance of ritual for the formation 
of religious concepts79. The great advantage of the enactive approach, with its focus on the embodied 
experience and embodied meaningful structures, is that it provides excellent tools to investigate the relation 
between action (e.g. sequences of ritual actions), the formation of concepts (e.g. religious concepts), and 
their linguistic formulations80.
 If ordinary sensorimotor patterns provide the basis for concept comprehension, so do the patterns realised 
during ritual. And these may differ from the ordinary ones. Chanting, dancing rhythmically, spinning relentlessly, 
inducing tremendous pain, constraining breath or remaining motionless for long hours provide novel ways 
of experiencing one’s own body. Such altered embodied experience provides ritual participants with new 
affordances (i.e. conceptualisations of their bodies’ possible interactions with environment)81.  Consequently, 
these, in order, enable the broadening of the semantic structures used to represent religious concepts.
Within the Indian tradition, the author’s field of interest, a strong correspondence between the 
experience of the body and religio-philosophical concepts is visible already in the upanishadic literature82. 
A tight relation between the embodied and the divine is especially visible in the medieval haṭha yoga 
tradition, in which the so-called mystical anatomy, visibly tied to the tendency to adopt particular bodily 
postures during ritual, provides the basis for complex soteriological concepts83. Within Iyengar Yoga, the 
embodied experience acquired during āsana and prāṇāyāma practice also shows great coherence with the 
schematic structure of religio-philosophical concepts adopted from  sāṃkhya-yoga.
The author’s ongoing study, whose first part was summarised on the foregoing pages, involves the 
juxtaposition of the IS derived from Iyengar’s writings, pertaining to the categories of pātañjala yoga, 
to the IS which are especially salient during āsana ritual84. The performance of āsana sequences within 
IY is accompanied by very precise verbal instructions provided to the practitioners by teachers. These 
instructions describe in great detail the numerous motor acts, which need to be performed in order to 
75 Barrett, “Coding and Quantifying Counterintuitiveness in Religious Concepts”, 326-328.
76 McCauley and Lawson, “Rethinking Religion”, “Bringing Ritual to Mind”.
77 See e.g. Whitehouse, “Arguments and Icons”. For a more recent take, see Whitehouse and Lanman, “The Ties That Bind Us”.
78 Atran, “In Gods We Trust”, 149-173.
79 See e.g. Purzycki and Willard, “MCI theory: a critical discussion”, 25 ff.
80 For the discussion of the relation between language comprehension and action simulation, its neurophysical model and 
experimental research related to it, see e.g. Gallese and Lakoff, “The Brain’s Concepts”, 455-479, and Glenberg, “Toward 
the Integration of Bodily States, Language, and Action”. Gallese and Lakoff provide, i.a., a neurophysiological model of the 
formation of IS. 
81 Glenberg, “Toward the Integration of Bodily States, Language, and Action”, 44-45.
82 See e.g. Wujastyk, “Interpreting the Image of the Human Body”.
83 See McEvilley, “The Spinal Serpent”, 93-113.
84 For the discussion of IY āsana practice as a ritual see De Michelis, “Modern Yoga and the Western Esoteric Tradition”, and 
Ciołkosz, “The Quasi-Linguistic Structure of Iyengar Yoga Āsana Practice”.
Investigating the Structure of Religious Concepts   103
achieve the desired pose. Thus, the actual physical forms of the postures (especially those experienced by 
the researcher engaged in participating observation), paired with transcripts of the teachers’ commands, 
provide an excellent material for linguistic analysis. During such analysis, the author obtained some 
interesting data, which may be used to explain the specificity of the concepts of puruṣa, buddhi and samādhi 
discussed on the foregoing pages. 
A careful description and execution of an āsana involves precise delimitation within the practitioner’s 
body of small areas, which become reified. The examples of such areas, whose size decreases as practice 
progresses, may be a kneecap, the top of the thigh, the front inner groin, the skin on the sides of the neck or 
the web between the big toe and the second toe of the right foot. As a result, the body is conceptualised and 
felt as a system assembled of numerous, very small objects. The specific linguistic constructions applied by 
teachers during practice, such as the use of simple imperatives (e.g. lift the kneecaps, suck the skin on the 
sides of the neck into the cervical vertebrae), or the dropping of possessive pronouns in front of body part 
names (i.e. lift the kneecaps rather than lift your kneecaps), result in the removal of the practitioner as agent 
from the conceptualisation of the performed actions. As an outcome, the body parts are construed as self-
propelled. As the practitioner still needs to exert his or her will to bid those animate body parts move, the 
notion of communication and, as a result, mentality of the body parts emerges. Thus, the aforementioned 
kneecap or the web between the toes becomes a tiny person. As body parts become personified, the reified 
conscious principles adopted from the sāṃkhya-yoga tradition (e.g. buddhi and puruṣa), incorporated into 
an extended model of the body, are personified as well. Moreover, the background knowledge that a person 
is equipped with a mental apparatus comprised of buddhi and puruṣa results in the attribution of these 
principles to each and every part of the body.
Anthropomorphisation of infinitesimal body parts provides the basis for the notion of even distribution 
of the buddhi-puruṣa conscious solution inside the body, achieved in Iyengar’s samādhi.  This notion, 
however, is enforced by yet another kind of experience. As the practitioner represents the āsana he or she 
performs, their attention moves across the body - from the web between the toes, towards the kneecap, 
the front inner groin, up to the skin on the sides of the neck and the rupee-sized crown of the head. It also 
moves inward, from the skin on the neck towards the cervical vertebrae, and outward, from the shoulder-
joint socket to the skin on the tips of the fingers. Such conceptualising activity, referred to as scanning by 
Langacker85, results in the notion of the practitioner’s attention flowing along and inside the body - hence 
the IS of FLUIDITY, characterising the conscious principle of buddhi. As āsana practice progresses, the 
numerous motor patterns of different body parts need to be represented and performed simultaneously, so 
that the mental scanning of the model of the body should follow in a summary, rather than in sequential 
fashion. Such experience results in the notion, that the conscious fluid fills the entire body in a uniform 
manner - samādhi sensu Iyengar is attained. 
Conclusion
The foregoing summary hopefully demonstrates how a careful study of religious narratives and the 
sensorimotor patterns characteristic of ritual activity may contribute to a better understanding of the 
origin of religious ideas. Taking into consideration not isolated concepts but rather textual materials 
and sequences of actions, provides a broad context in which these concepts may be situated. Applying 
the category of embodied cognition makes it possible to analyse religious representations not only 
from the vantage point of postulated innate conceptual structures (such as ontological categories), but 
from the perspective of the actual, everyday experience, continuously influencing human cognitive 
structures and propensities. The vast category of image schemata allows for a more detailed and 
flexible description of religious concepts than a rather rigid system of ontological categories, with 
their limited number of transfers and breaches. 
85 Langacker, “Cognitive Grammar”, 82 ff. Scanning may be performed through a variety of conceptual domains; in the given 
example it is the domain of one’s own body.
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It is hoped that a broader application of the enactive approach and the notion of image schemata to the 
study of religion will contribute to the development of a comprehensive view on the structure of religious 
concepts in different traditions. Such studies may provide a better understanding of not only what kinds of 
conceptualisations are most common in religious discourse but also of what kinds of experience contribute 
the most to the shaping of religious thought. Such pursuit would bring valuable developments to the 
Cognitive Science of Religion.
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